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Abstract 
The paper investigates how multinational subsidiaries develop their political strategies within 
the constraints of institutional duality. Based on the empirical investigation of western 
subsidiaries operating in the post-socialist institutional context of Hungary, I develop a model 
that illustrates how political capabilities – affected by institutional duality - underpin the 
lobbying strategy of MNE subsidiaries. The article makes a theoretical connection between 
the literatures on institutional duality and corporate political activity (CPA) and makes three 
distinct theoretical contributions. First, I transfer the analysis of nonmarket strategies from the 
institutional to the firm level, by opening the black box of how subsidiaries develop host 
country strategies. Second, by focusing on the process of how subsidiaries turn external and 
internal resources into political capabilities, I argue that institutional duality should be viewed 
as an endogenous aspect of the institutional framework, which equips firms with political 
capabilities, rather than an exogenous factor that constraints companies and disadvantage 
them in the host environment (Nell et al., 2014, Tempel et al., 2006). Third the study 
contributes to the theory of MNE parent-subsidiary management literature by extending our 
knowledge on how parent strategies affect the development of subsidiary’s political 
strategies.   
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1. Introduction	Political	 strategies	 of	 multinational	 enterprises	 (MNEs)	 are	 increasingly	 seen	 as	important	nonmarket	elements	of	firm	strategies	(Nell	et	al.	2015).	Previous	research	within	the	international	business	literature	has	investigated	MNEs’	political	strategies	from	an	institutional	theory	 perspective,	 focusing	 on	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	 host	 country	 environment	 on	 subsidiaries	(Blumentritt	&	Nigh	2002;	Blumentritt	2003).	Within	 the	 institutional	duality	 context	 scholars	have	 limited	 their	 focus	on	 the	determinants	of	MNE	subsidiaries’	political	 strategies	 (Hillman	and	Wan,	2005),	and	argued	that	the	institutional	pressures	from	public	and	private	nonmarket	actors	 	 in	emerging	markets	lead	to	increased	political	activism	(Nell	et	al.	2015).	However	we	still	 know	 little	 about	 the	 firm-level	 strategy	 building	 process	 itself.	 We	 need	 to	 revisit	institutional	 duality	 and	 subsidiaries’	 political	 strategies	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 studies	 that	investigate	 political	 strategies	 of	 western	 multinationals	 in	 the	 Asian	 context	 (Luo	 and	 Zhao,	2013)	 suggest	 that	 subsidiaries	 engage	 in	 the	 host	 country’s	 political	 strategies,	 yet	 do	 not	explore	whether	these	subsidiaries	implement	any	of	their	parent	strategies	in	the	host	context	as	well,	and	if	so	how.	Second,	existing	studies	do	not	explain	to	us	how	subsidiaries	address	the	conflicting	pressures	of	institutional	duality	in	their	strategy-making	process.	I	argue	that	in	the	emerging	market	 context	 a	 single	 focus	 on	 institutional	 duality	 from	 a	 legitimacy	 perspective	(Kostova	and	Zaheer,	1999)	is	less	adequate	than	a	focus	on	strategy	development.		Earlier	studies	have	specifically	called	 for	 the	 investigation	of	how	subsidiaries	 react	 to	institutional	 duality	 (Kostova	 et	 al.,	 2008)	 and	 ‘how	 subsidiaries	 manage	 the	 pressures	 of	conforming	 both	 to	 the	 strategic	 requirements	 placed	 on	 them	 by	 their	 MNCs	 and	 the	institutional	pressures	placed	on	them	by	their	host	countries’	(Blumentritt	and	Nigh,	2002:	71).	Addressing	 these	 calls	 I	 argue	 that	 to	 understand	 the	 interaction	 of	 parent	 and	 host	 country	forces	 on	 the	 development	 of	 subsidiary’s	 political	 activities	 we	 need	 to	 investigate	 the	mechanisms,	and	the	strategy-building	process	on	the	firm	level.		Therefore,	in	contrast	to	existing	literature,	in	this	study,	the	level	of	analysis	is	the	firm,	which	has	been	largely	neglected	previously	in	institutional	scholarship	(Greenwood	et	al.,	2014).		Building	on	 the	 theory	of	 ‘institutional	duality’	 (Kostova	and	Roth,	2002)	and	using	 the	resource	dependence	(Pfeffer	and	Salancik,	2003)	and	political	capabilities	models	(Lawton	and	Rajwani,	 2011,	 Oliver	 and	 Holzinger,	 2008,	 Teece	 et	 al.,	 1997),	 I	 find	 that	 western	 MNE	subsidiaries	 design	 a	 localised	 lobbying	 strategy	 in	 emerging	 capitalist	 systems.	 Instead	 of	transposing	their	parent	strategies,	and	adjusting	them	to	the	degree	of	pluralism/corporatism	of	 the	host	country	(Hillman	and	Wan,	2005)	or	adapting	to	 the	host	country’s	strategies	(Luo	
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and	Zhao,	2013)	as	it	was	suggested	in	earlier	studies,	subsidiaries	use	political	resources	from	their	 external	 and	 internal	 environment	 and	 turn	 them	 into	 political	 capabilities	 under	 the	influence	 of	 institutional	 duality.	 By	 organising	 resources	 from	 the	 parent	 company,	 the	 host	environment	 and	 the	 subsidiary	 firms	 develop	 a	 unique	 political	 strategy	 that	 is	 completely	localised,	but	is	based	on	a	mixture	of	arm’s	length	and	network-based	lobbying	capabilities.	This	way,	 local	subsidiary	managers	may	use	the	home	country	as	a	resource	centre	to	support	 the	strategies	designed	in	the	host	country’s	institutional	environment,	but	their	behaviours	are	not	‘controlled’	 to	 be	 aligned	 with	 the	 parent	 company’s	 intentions	 as	 was	 previously	 suggested	(Birkinshaw	&	Pedersen	2009).		I	argue	that	institutional	duality	should	not	be	viewed	as	an	exogenous	and	constraining	factor	to	business	strategy	(Nell	et	al.,	2015,	Kostova	and	Roth,	2002,	Hillman	and	Wan,	2005).	Instead,	it	should	 be	 treated	 as	 an	 endogenous	 aspect	 of	 the	 institutional	 framework	 within	 the	 global	politic	al	economy,	which	may	equip	firms	with	diverse	political	capabilities	and	might	be	used	to	gain	competitive	advantage	in	foreign	markets.		Rather	 than	 aiming	 to	 develop	 a	 definitive	 framework	 to	 explain	 subsidiary	 capability	development	 this	 article	 attempts	 to	 illustrate	 some	ways	 in	which	 firms	address	 institutional	complexity	when	developing	political	strategies	in	emerging	host	country	contexts.	The	article	is	structured	 as	 follows.	 First	 I	 explore	 how	 political	 strategies	 differ	 in	 western	 and	 emerging	capitalist	systems.	Then	I	describe	the	theoretical	framework,	and	the	methods.	In	the	following	sections	I	introduce	the	empirical	case,	and	investigate	the	political	capabilities	and	strategies	of	MNE	subsidiaries	in	Hungary.	In	the	final	section	I	conclude.			 	
5		
2. Corporate	political	activity	in	western	and	emerging	capitalist	
systems	MNEs’	experiences	in	emerging	markets,	including	central	and	eastern	Europe	have	highlighted	the	 importance	 of	 institutions,	 not	 only	 exogenously	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 they	 produce	 specific	constraints	 for	 firms,	 but	 also	 how	 they	 lead	 to	 different	 firm	 behaviours	 across	 institutional	settings	 (Jackson	and	Deeg,	2008).	External	 institutional	pressures	originate	mostly	 from	non-market	actors	in	the	subsidiary’s	surroundings,	such	as	the	host	country	government	or	regional	governments	 as	 well	 as	 non-governmental	 interest	 groups	 (Nell	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 In	 emerging		economies	 the	 government’s	 impact	 on	 economic	 life	 is	 often	 considered	 more	 substantial	(Boisot	and	Child,	1996,	Borragán,	2006)	and	institutions	in	general	‘far	more	pertinent’	(Meyer	and	Peng,	 2016:	4)	 than	 in	developed	 economies.	The	 state’s	 fundamental	 control	 on	national	resources	 in	 economic	 and	 social	 transitions	 makes	 state-business	 relations	 essential	 to	 firm	growth	(Luo	and	Zhao,	2013a).	This	importance	is	magnified	for	foreign	firms,	since	local	firms	might	 enjoy	domestic	 privileges	 (Kostova	 and	Zaheer,	 1999).	 	Hence,	 firms	 engage	 in	political	activities,	because	the	social,	political,	legal	and	cultural	institutional	context	affects	their	ability	to	 success	 in	 the	 market	 place	 (Feinberg	 et	 al.	 2015)	 and	 may	 constrain	 or	 facilitate	 their	activities	(Doh	et	al.	2012).	Political	strategies	are	seen	as	important	nonmarket	elements	of	firm	strategy,	comprising	of	actions	to	affect	the	public	policy	environment	and	to	influence	decision-makers’	opinions	(Nell	et	al.,	2015).			Research	suggests	that	the	way	in	which	firms	engage	in	political	activities	in	western	and	emerging	 capitalist	 systems	 is	 different.	 In	 developed	 market	 economies,	 corporate	 political	activity	(CPA)	is	“largely	about	legal,	firm-level	engagement	with	institutionalised	political	actors	and	structures”	(Lawton	et	al.,	2012:	87).	Scholars	define	public	affairs	in	the	western	capitalist	contexts	as	an	issue-driven	activity,	in	which	the	rules	of	the	game	are	more	or	less	transparent	and	clear	(Griffin	&	Dunn	2004;	McGrath	2005;	Van	Schendelen	2012).	Hence	CPA	in	the	western	institutional	framework	is	mostly	viewed	as	an	“essential,	legitimate	and	distinguishable	activity,	which	supplements	business	activity”	(Hadjikhani	and	Ghauri	2006:	391).	According	to	studies,	political	 strategy	 is	 dominantly	 managed	 through	 arm’s	 length,	 formalised	 and	 increasingly	professionalised	practices	(Mcgrath	2008;	McGrath	2005;	Mcgrath	et	al.	2010),	especially	in	the	UK	(Thomson	and	John,	2007,	Hillman	and	Keim,	1995),	the	US	and	the	EU	(Beyers	et	al.,	2008,	Coen,	 1999,	 Mahoney,	 2008).	 Of	 course	 this	 does	 not	 imply	 either	 that	 informal,	 or	 formal	networks	would	not	be	an	important	part	of	lobbying	in	these	systems,	or	that	of	interpersonal	
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relationships	are	not	 important	 in	consolidated	market	economies.	 Indeed	earlier	studies	have	indicated	that	interpersonal	power	relations	(Granovetter	1985)	and	social	networks	matter	in	western	 societies	 as	 well	 (King	 &	 Pearce	 2010;	 McDonnell	 &	 Werner	 2016).	 However,	 the	importance	 and	 the	 occurrence	 of	 informal	 and	 relationship-based	 practices	 in	 nonmarket	strategy	 are	 significantly	 smaller	 than	 in	 emerging	 market	 economies,	 where	 the	 “kind	 of	structured	CPA	known	in	developed	states	has	been	largely	presumed	not	to	exist”	(Lawton	et	al.	2012:	7).	As	a	result	of	its	post-socialist	institutional	development,	in	central	and	eastern	European	(CEE)	 countries	 public	 affairs	 are	 not	 understood	 as	 ways	 of	 interest	 representation	 and	lobbying,	which	create	a	legitimate	link		between	business,	society	and	the	government	(McGrath	et	al.,	2010),	but	are	rather	viewed	as	a	form	of	corruption	(Millar	and	Koppl,	2014),	or	at	least	the	 extensive	 use	 of	 connections	 or	 cronyism	 (Lawton	 et	 al.	 2012).	 	 In	 emerging	 capitalist	systems	including	CEE,	the	public	affairs	culture	is	missing	(Harsanyi	and	Schmidt,	2012)	and	the	topic	 of	 lobbying	 remains	 a	 taboo	 (Sallai,	 2013).	 Consequently	 in	many	 CEE	 countries	 public	affairs	 is	not	seen	as	a	valuable	corporate	 function	and	therefore	 it	 is	often	outsourced	(Millar	and	Koppl,	2014)	or	managed	by	 the	CEOs	 themselves	 (Sallai,	2013).	Some	even	argue	 that	 in	post-socialist	 countries,	 both	 local	 and	 global	 firms	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 legitimise	 political	strategies	 (Millar	 and	Koppl,	 2014)	 and	 hence	 to	 develop	 a	 professional	 public	 affairs	 culture	(Harsanyi	and	Schmidt,	2012).	This	striking	difference	between	CPA	strategies	is	not	surprising	if	we	look	at	the	institutional	context	of	eastern	European	capitalism.		The	first	20	years	of	transition	has	created	an	institutional	environment,	in	which	political	and	 economic	 relationships	 became	 strongly	 interlinked,	 and	 status	 and	 personal	 ties	 often	supersede	the	authority	of	independent	formal	institutions	(Grzymala-Busse	and	Luong,	2002).	The	 distinct	 institutionalisation	 process	 of	 post-socialist	 capitalism	 created	 a	 framework	 that	differs	 greatly	 from	western	 capitalist	 systems,	because	here	 informal	 institutions	 (Meyer	 and	Peng,	2006)	and	 interpersonal	networks	 (Peng,	2003b)	have	a	much	more	crucial	 role	 than	 in	advanced	capitalist	societies	(Hancké	et	al.	2012;	Sik	&	Wellman	1997;	Bohle	&	Greskovits	2009;	Hancke	2009).	Although	 informal	 institutions	have	a	 role	 in	western	societies	as	well,	 in	post-socialist	 economies,	 where	 formal	 institutional	 structures	 are	 weak	 (Grzymala-Busse,	 2004	 ,	Grzymala-Busse,	 2012,	 Wallace	 and	 Latcheva,	 2006)	 they	 shape	 many	 areas	 of	 social	organization,	 including	 corporate	 ownership	 structures,	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources,	 the	structure	of	 influence	as	well	as	the	nature	of	governance	and	the	state	(Wedel,	2003:	428).	 In	these	systems,	political	activity	for	firms	revolves	around	social	networks	and	the	exploitation	of	
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family	or	other	social	connections	and	business	networks	(Lawton	et	al.	2012:7;	Peng	and	Heath,	1996).	 The	 weak	 nature	 of	 formal	 institutions	 encourages	 firms	 to	 develop	 informal	relationships	 (Peng,	 2003c,	 Luo	 and	 Zhao,	 2013b)	 as	 well	 as	 informal	 political	 engagement	strategies	 (Lawton	 et	 al.,	 2012).	As	 these	 	 network-based	 strategies	 are	 less	 transferable	 than	other	capabilities,	MNEs	often	hire	 local	managers	to	manage	their	political	activities	(Luo	and	Zhao,	2013b)	or	engage	in	buffering	strategies	if	political	connections	become	disadvantageous	due	to	the	change	in	political	leadership	(Boddewyn	and	Dieleman,	2012).	Indeed	Luo	and	Zhao	defined	 relational	 political	 strategy	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 build	 “long	 term	 relationships	 with	 host	country	 government	 agencies	 and	 officials	 to	 influence	 government	 policy	 and/or	 acquire	government	 controlled	 resources”	 (Luo	 and	 Zhao,	 2013:	 517).	 Some	 even	 argue	 that	 in	 these	economies	relationships	at	different	levels	of	social	organization	are	the	“lifeblood	of	economic	development	 and	 business	 conduct”	 (Luo	 and	 Zhao,	 2013:	 516).	 The	 importance	 of	 informal	networks	in	state-business	relations	have	been	widely	recognised,	not	only	in	China	(Boisot	and	Child,	1996)	or	Russia	 (Puffer	and	McCarthy,	2007),	but	also	 in	EU-member	eastern	European	countries,	 like	 Poland	 (McMenamin	 and	 Schoenman,	 2007,	 Schoenman,	 2005)	 and	 Hungary	(Sallai,	 2013,	 Stark,	 1996,	 Stark	 and	 Vedres,	 2012,	 Danis	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Here	 network-based	political	 strategies	 are	 more	 important	 than	 transactional	 ones,	 because	 only	 relationship	building	helps	businesses	to	obtain	external	resources	and	institutional	support	(Peng	2003,	Luo	and	Zhao	2013).		From	the	discussion	above	it	is	easy	to	see	why	MNEs	from	developed	market	economies	may	face	conflicting	pressures	in	emerging	or	transition	economies:	on	the	one	hand	they	want	to	 be	 in	 line	 with	 their	 internal	 demands	 and	 would	 try	 to	 implement	 arm’s	 length,	professionalised	 and	 transactional	 political	 strategies,	 while	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 they	 face	 the	external	pressures	 towards	network-based	exchange	mechanisms	and	 informal	practice	 (Peng	2003,	 Luo	 and	 Zhao	 2013).	 Western	 MNE	 subsidiaries	 hence	 face	 contrasting	 institutional	pressures	as	the	nonmarket	environment	of	their	home	and	host	country	contexts	are	markedly	different	(Meyer	and	Peng,	2016).			
3. Theoretical	framework	In	 all	 national	 economies	 multinational	 corporations	 face	 conflicting	 institutional	pressures	as	they	have	to	establish	and	maintain	legitimacy	both	externally	in	their	multiple	host	environments	and	 internally	 towards	 the	parent	company	(Kostova	and	Zaheer,	1999).	On	 the	
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one	 hand	 multinationals	 strive	 to	 adapt	 to	 their	 host	 country	 environment	 and	 become	isomorphic	with	the	local	institutional	context	(DiMaggio	and	Powell,	2000),	while	on	the	other	hand	 they	 try	 to	 leverage	 organizational	 capabilities	 on	 a	worldwide	 scale	 and	 achieve	 global	integration	 in	 their	 strategies	 (Kostova	 and	 Roth,	 2002).	 ‘Institutional	 duality’	 refers	 to	 the	conflicting	pressures	 that	 subsidiaries	 face,	when	 they	 try	 to	adopt	 their	parent’s	 strategies	 in	the	host	country’s	external	institutional	constraints	(Kostova	and	Roth,	2002:	227).	A	number	of	studies	 claim	 that	 political	 activities	 of	 subsidiaries	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 host	 country	 context	(Hillman	 and	 Wan,	 2005,	 Hillman	 et	 al.,	 2004,	 Lawton	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 and	 the	 coordination	mechanisms	 within	 MNE	 subsidiaries	 (Blumentritt	 and	 Nigh,	 2002).	 Besides,	 earlier	 studies	argue	that	industry	competition	and	the	country’s	political	institutional	structure	may	also	affect	firms’	 policymaking	 influence	 (Macher	 and	Mayo,	 2015)	 and	 that	MNE	 subsidiaries	 encounter	pressure	 to	 conform	 to	 host	 country	 expectations,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 corruption	 domain	 (Spencer	and	Gomez,	2011).	Yet,	what	is	missing	from	the	literature	is	a	detailed	work	on	the	mechanisms	through	which	the	forces	stemming	from	institutional	duality	shape	business	arrangements	and	conceptual	frameworks.	We	know	little	about	how	subsidiaries	develop	and	manage	their	local	political	strategies	within	the	conflicting	dual	institutional	constraints.	While	earlier	studies	have	explored	 institutional	 duality,	 they	 approached	 the	 topic	 from	 an	 institutional	 perspective,	leaving	the	‘black	box’	of	firm-level	strategy	making	unexplored.		At	the	level	of	the	firm,	institutional	theory	can	be	linked	back	to	the	resource-based	view	(RBV),	as	it	helps	us	understand	how	firms	adapt	to	changes	and	evolutions	in	their	non-market	environment,	particularly	in	emerging	markets	(Lawton	et	al.	2012:	7).	By	focusing	on	how	firms	develop	their	lobbying	capabilities	within	the	constraints	of	institutional	duality,	it	seems	logical	to	 view	 nonmarket	 strategies	 not	 only	 within	 an	 institutional	 level	 perspective	 as	 previous	studies	have	done	(Tempel	et	al.	2006;	Hillman	&	Wan	2005;	Nell	et	al.	2015),	but	rather	as	a	firm	 level,	 political	 capability	 building	 process.	Hence,	 in	 this	 paper	 I	will	 apply	 the	 resource-based	theory	to	the	analysis	of	MNE	subsidiaries’	lobbying	activities.			According	 to	 RBV,	 inimitable	 or	 not	 easily	 substitutable	 resources	 that	 are	 owned	 or	controlled	by	firms	may	provide	competitive	advantage	on	the	market	(Peteraf,	1993)	and	also	in	the	nonmarket	environment	(Bandelj	and	Purg,	2006,	Lomnitz	and	Sheinbaum,	2004,	Sik	and	Wellman,	 1997,	Windolf,	 2002).	 Resources	 alone	 however	 do	 not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 efficient	political	 engagement.	 In	 order	 to	 engage	 in	 political	 activities,	 firms	 need	 to	 make	 strategic	decisions	 concerning	 their	 corporate	 political	 strategy	 (Hillman	 and	 Hitt	 1999;	 Taminiau	 and	
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Wilts	2006)	and	 turn	 their	available	resources	 into	 lobbying	capabilities	 (Lawton	and	Rajwani	2011;	Lawton,	Rajwani	 et	 al.	 2013).	Hence	 in	 this	 context,	managerial	 choice	becomes	 crucial.	Management	 scholars	 make	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 financial	 resources	 and	 firm	 level	 strategy	development,	 by	 identifying	different	 types	of	 corporate	political	 resources	 (Dahan	2005)	 and	investigating	how	resources	may	be	turned	into	capabilities	by	managerial	actions.	By	definition,	capabilities	refer	to	a	“firm’s	capacity	to	deploy	resources”	(Amit	and	Schoemaker	1993:	35)	as	well	 as	 its	 “ability	 to	 integrate,	 build,	 and	 reconfigure	 internal	 and	 external	 competences	 to	address	 rapidly	 changing	 environments”	 (Teece,	 Pisano	 et	 al.	 1997:	 516).	 Hence,	 it	 is	 not	“sufficient	 for	 firms	 to	 simply	 possess	 resources”,	 they	 must	 be	 able	 to	 turn	 them	 into	 firm-specific	dynamic	 capabilities	 in	order	 to	 “effectively	develop	 strategies	 to	manage	 the	political	environment”	 (Oliver	 and	 Holzinger	 2008:	 15,	 16).	 Political	 capabilities	 can	 be	 internal	 and	external	 in	 nature	 (Oliver	 and	Holzinger	 2008).	While	 internal	 capabilities	 refer	 to	 individual	lobbying	 by	 the	 firm,	 external	 capabilities	 describe	 political	 action	 through	 trade	 associations	and	contract	 lobbyists	 (Lawton,	Rajwani	et	 al.	2013).	 In	 this	article	both	 internal	 and	external	capabilities	will	be	explored.	Previous	studies	explored	what	type	of	subsidiary,	host	country	and	parent	 factors	may	be	linked	to	the	legitimacy	of	subsidiaries’	political	strategies	(Hillman	and	Wan,	2005).	Hillman	and	Wan	argued	that	both	formal	and	informal	institutions	are	important	factors	in	determining	foreign	subsidiaries’	political	strategies	(2005).	However	 they	have	not	explored	 in	what	ways	these	 formal	and	 informal	 institutional	 factors	become	 integrated	within	 the	subsidiaries	 local	strategies.	Similarly,	earlier	research	have	explored	the	‘antecedents’	of	how	political	capabilities	are	 organised	 within	 changing	 transnational	 policy	 context	 and	 highlighted	 the	 crucial	importance	of	managerial	choice	in	organising	political	capabilities	(Doh	et	al.,	2012,	Lawton	and	Rajwani,	 2011,	 Lawton	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 However	 these	 studies	 have	 not	 informed	 us	 about	 the	process	through	which	capabilities	are	turned	into	strategies	within	the	conflicting	constraints	of	institutional	duality.		Despite	the	value	of	these	earlier	works,	we	still	know	little	about	the	firm-level	process	of	capability	building	for	political	activities	 in	the	emerging	market	context.	Therefore	this	article	explores	the	following	interrelated	research	questions	(RQ):		
RQ1:	‘How	political	capabilities	-	formed	through	the	pressures	of	institutional	duality	-	emerge	and	
underpin	the	political	strategies	of	MNE	subsidiaries?’	
RQ2:	‘How	subsidiaries	organise	and	manage	corporate	political	activities	(CPA)	within	the	
pressures	of	institutional	duality?’	
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RQ3:	In	what	ways	are	subsidiaries	affected	by	the	parent	company’s	political	strategies	and	CPA	
activities	in	the	development	of	their	local	political	strategies?			Answering	these	questions	would	not	only	further	our	theoretical	knowledge,	but	could	provide	useful	insights	about	strategy	building	for	managers	engaging	in	political	activities	in	emerging	markets.	 Earlier	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 resources	 and	 capabilities	 deriving	 from	MNEs	home	 country	 practices	 give	 advantages	 to	 subsidiaries	 when	 entering	 foreign	 markets	(Ahmadjian,	2016).		Furthermore,	in	their	global	expansion,	MNEs	maintain	their	organisational	systems	derived	from	their	home	institutions	in	order	to	gain	competitive	advantage	(Luo,	2002)	abroad.	Consequently	one	would	expect	that	MNE	subsidiaries	may	gain	competitive	advantage	in	 the	 network-based	 host	 country	 context	 by	 implementing	 the	 professional,	 arm’s	 length	political	 strategies	 used	 in	 their	 mother	 country.	 Hence	 this	 article	 will	 test	 the	 following	proposition.		
Proposition	1:	MNE	subsidiaries	transpose	their	parent’s	political	strategies	in	the	host	country	in	
order	to	gain	competitive	advantage	locally.		In	contrast	to	the	home	country,	in	the	emerging	market	context,	networks	have	been	identified	as	 inimitable	 and	 unique	 resources	 that	 firms	may	 use	 to	 access	 crucial	 resources	 from	 their	institutional	environment	 (Gulati	et	al.,	2000).	Network	 ties	or	more	practically	 the	boundary-spanning	 links	 between	 firms	 and	 government	 officials	 enable	 a	 firm	 to	 acquire	 or	 retain	 a	competitive	 advantage	 (Doh	 et	 al.,	 2012:31).	 Networks	 can	 enable	 firms	 to	 get	 access	 to	 the	policy-making	 process	 (Bandelj	 and	 Purg,	 2006,	 Lomnitz	 and	 Sheinbaum,	 2004,	 Sik	 and	Wellman,	1997,	Windolf,	2002),	or	increase	their	knowledge	about	public	policy	that	otherwise	would	not	be	accessible.	Hence,	relationships	or	social	capital	may	provide	access	to	information,	policy-making	or	even	capital	(Gulati	et	al.,	2000).	Indeed,	 the	 larger	 the	 regulatory	distance	between	 the	home	and	 the	host	 country,	 the	more	 institutional	 pressures	 subsidiaries	 are	 facing	 and	 hence	 the	 more	 inclined	 they	 get	 to	develop	relational	or	network-based	political	strategies	to	offset	their	local	disadvantages	(Luo	and	 Zhao,	 2013b).	 Accordingly,	 subsidiaries	 improve	 their	 host	 country	 performance	 by	formulating	a	 relational	political	 strategy	 to	address	 the	unique	 requirements	of	 the	emerging	market	environment	(Luo	and	Zhao,	2013b).	Based	on	these	earlier	 findings	one	would	expect	that	 subsidiaries	 adapt	 to	 the	 network-based	 system	 of	 emerging	 markets	 and	 distance	themselves	from	the	arm’s-length	political	strategies	used	by	their	parent.		
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Proposition	2:	MNE	subsidiaries	engage	in	network-based	political	strategies	in	order	to	adapt	to	
the	local	institutional	requirements.		Indeed	the	literature	claims	that	firms	confronted	with	conflicting	isomorphic	pressures	tend	 to	 either	 choose	 the	more	 ‘legitimacy-enhancing	 practice	 and	 adopt	 it’	 (Nell	 et	 al.,	 2015:	304)	or	‘pretend’	to	follow	certain	institutionalised	rules,	while	actually	conducting	business	in	different	ways.	This	latter	is	often	referred	to	as	‘ceremonial	adoption’	(Kostova	et	al.,	2008).		
Proposition	3:	MNE	subsidiaries	 ‘pretend’	to	follow	the	political	strategies	of	the	parent	company,	
but	in	practice	they	engage	in	network-based	lobbying	(ceremonial	adaptation).			The	 current	 study	will	 test	 these	 propositions	 by	 investigating	 the	 political	 strategies	 of	MNE	subsidiaries	in	the	post-socialist,	network-based	institutional	context	of	Hungary.			In	this	article	I	attempt	to	achieve	two	goals.	First	to	conceptualise	the	strategy	building	process	of	MNE	subsidiaries	within	the	pressures	of	institutional	duality,	and	second	to	develop	a	model	that	 illustrates	 how	 political	 capabilities	 (that	 underpin	 these	 strategies)	 are	 formed	 through	institutional	duality.	I	make	three	distinct	theoretical	contributions.	First,	I	transfer	the	analysis	of	nonmarket	strategies	from	the	institutional	to	the	firm	level,	by	opening	the	black	box	of	how	subsidiaries	develop	 host	 country	 strategies.	 Second,	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 process	 of	 how	 subsidiaries	 turn	external	and	internal	resources	into	political	capabilities,	I	argue	that	institutional	duality	should	be	 viewed	 as	 an	 endogenous	 aspect	 of	 the	 institutional	 framework,	 which	 equips	 firms	 with	political	 capabilities,	 rather	 than	 an	 exogenous	 factor	 that	 constraints	 companies	 and	disadvantage	 them	 in	 the	 host	 environment	 (Nell	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 Tempel	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 Third	 the	study	contributes	 to	 the	 theory	of	MNE	parent-subsidiary	management	 literature	by	exploring	the	ways	in	which	parent	strategies	affect	the	development	of	subsidiary’s	political	strategies.				
4. Methods	The	study	is	based	on	the	case	study	of	Hungary.	Building	theory	from	a	case	study	is	a	strategy	that	 involves	using	a	case	to	create	theoretical	constructs,	propositions	and	empirical	evidence	(Eisenhardt	 and	 Graebner,	 2007).	 As	 the	 research	 questions	 of	 this	 study	 are	 process-related	questions,	focusing	on	how	subsidiaries	develop	lobbying	strategies,	a	qualitative	approach	was	chosen.	 	 The	 focus	 of	 the	 study	 is	 to	 explore	 an	 actual	 phenomenon	 that	 has	 rarely	 been	addressed	and	answered	previously.	 In	 such	 cases,	when	 “’how	and	 ‘why’	questions	are	being	
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posed,	 when	 the	 investigator	 has	 little	 control	 over	 events,	 and	 when	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 a	contemporary	phenomenon”	the	case	study	method	is	the	preferred	strategy	(Yin	1984:	1).			Hungary	 has	 been	 considered	 one	 of	 the	most	 consolidated	 democracies	 among	 post-socialist	countries	until	recently.	Since	the	2010	elections,	however	-	when	Viktor	Orbán’s	conservative	party,	Fidesz	acquired	a	two-thirds	majority	in	the	parliament	-	Hungary’s	“democracy	score	has	steadily	 declined“,	 bringing	 it	 closer	 to	 some	 of	 the	 less	 developed	 semi-consolidated	democracies,	 like	 Romania	 and	 Bulgaria	 (Walker	 and	 Habdank–Kołaczkowska,	 2012:	 6).	 This	sudden	 change	 in	 political	 governance	 makes	 Hungary	 a	 critical	 case	 to	 explore.	 Since	 the	political	turn	in	1989,	Hungary	was	one	of	the	most	open	and	fast	growing	states	in	the	region.	It	was	 a	 front-runner	 in	 attracting	 FDI	 in	 the	 1990s	 both	 through	 privatizations	 and	 Greenfield	investments	 by	 foreign	MNEs.	However	 since	 2010,	 the	 country	 has	 become	 less	 attractive	 to	foreign	businesses,	as	the	Orbán	government	has	imposed	high	taxes	in	MNE	dominated	sectors	(Sass	 and	 Kalotay,	 2012:	 1)	 and	 engaged	 in	 a	 political	 rhetoric	 against	 foreign	 capital.	 In	 this	vividly	 changing	 institutional	 framework	 MNE	 subsidiaries	 have	 to	 operate	 in	 an	 extremely	uncertain	 environment,	 where	 rules	 might	 change	 from	 one	 day	 to	 the	 other	 (Sallai	 and	Schnyder,	2015)	and	where	the	impacts	of	institutional	duality	have	increased	substantially.	The	nature	of	the	critical	case	makes	the	investigation	of	the	impact	of	the	institutional	environment	easier,	because	patterns	become	more	visible	than	in	less	turbulent	times	(Flyvbjerg,	2006),	as	the	arbitrariness	of	 the	new	regime	amplified	 the	 system	characteristics	of	post-socialism	and	hence	 contextual	 relationships	 that	 had	 also	 been	 there	 previously,	 became	 apparent	 and	observable.	 This,	 from	 a	methodological	 perspective,	 is	 an	 important	 difference,	which	makes	Hungary	one	of	 the	most	suitable	states	 for	 the	 investigation	of	 the	research	question	at	hand.		Although	 the	 representativeness	 of	 the	 case	 study	 is	 limited,	 due	 to	 its	 ‘critical’	 nature,	nevertheless	the	Hungarian	case	may	not	be	unique	for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	in	the	future,	other	states	from	the	region	may	also	turn	into	a	similar	developmental	path	(Vliegenthart	2010)	and	second	-	even	if	other	countries	continue	on	a	more	democratic	developmental	path	–	it	 is	presumed	 that	 the	 system	 characteristics	 of	 post-socialist	 capitalism,	 that	 affect	 business	 in	Hungary,	influence	firms	in	other	EE	states	too,	even	if	on	a	less	observable	way.		Data	 collection	 and	 data	 analysis	 was	 carried	 out	 in	 parallel,	 which	 made	 it	 possible	 for	 the	researcher	to	develop	theoretical	insights	and	propositions,	while	testing	and	modifying	these	as	the	project	evolved.	Overlaps	 in	data	collection	and	analysis	 is	argued	 to	be	beneficial,	 since	 it	speeds	the	analysis	and	“reveals	helpful	adjustments	to	data	collection”	(Eisenhardt	1989:	535).		
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The	 empirical	 study	 comprised	 46	 semi-structured	 interviews	 out	 of	 which	 39	 were	conducted	 with	 business	 people	 and	 a	 further	 7	 with	 experts	 such	 as	 political	 advisors,	 or	representatives	 of	 NGOs	 and	 associations.	 In-depth	 interviews	 are	 an	 insightful	 method	 for	exploring	 the	 “often	nuanced	causal	 factors	of	 specific	managerial	action”	 (Lawton	et	al.	2013:	231).	It	 is	argued	that	quantitative	data	would	not	be	able	to	reveal	the	often	complex	thought	processes	 that	determine	managerial	decisions	 in	 relation	 to	 lobbying	engagement.	Due	 to	 the	exploratory	nature	of	 the	 research,	 the	 semi-structured	 interview	 technique	provided	 a	 single	framework	 for	 the	different	 interviews	–	 since	 it	permits	 comparison	 (Flynn,	 Sakakibara	et	 al.	1990)	–	but	also	gave	flexibility	to	ask	questions,	 in	relation	to	previously	not	 identified	issues	that	 arose	 from	 the	 interviewee’s	 comments	 (Bryman	 2004).	 This	 type	 of	 interviewing	 also	provided	 the	 flexibility	 for	 participants	 to	 highlight	 issues	 they	 considered	 most	 relevant	 in	relation	to	the	topic	(Bryman,	2004).		Interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	 between	 2009	 and	 2016.	 The	 research	 was	 carried	 out	based	on	purposive	 sampling	 through	predetermined	 selection	 criteria	 as	 it	 is	mostly	 done	 in	qualitative	 research	 (Miles	 and	 Huberman,	 1984,	 Miles	 and	 Huberman,	 1994).	 The	 sample	comprised	 of	 CEOs	 and	 PA	 directors	 at	 MNE	 subsidiaries	 and	 top	 managers	 at	 domestic	Hungarian	firms.	Only	MNEs	from	western	countries	were	included	in	the	study,	the	interviewed	subsidiaries	originated	from	the	UK,	Italy,	France,	Germany,	the	Netherlands	and	the	US.		Type	of	firm	 Number	of	interviews	MNE	subsidiary	 20	Hungarian	state-owned	company	 7	Hungarian	private	company	 7	Hungarian	SME	 5	Total	number	of	interviews	with	business	leaders	 39		The	 sectoral	 share	 of	 interviewed	 firms	 has	 been	 rather	 diverse,	 since	 companies	 from	 15	different	sectors	have	been	included	in	the	sample.	Out	of	all	the	sectors,	the	banking	sector	with	five,	 while	 the	 energy,	 retail	 and	 manufacturing	 sectors	 with	 3-3	 interviews	 had	 the	 most	respondents	within	 the	 sample.	 Interviews	were	 coded	 and	 analysed	 by	 NVivo	 software.	 The	software	helped	in	displaying	ideas	and	creating	links	between	themes	and	occurring	patterns.	After	 the	 transcription	 of	 interviews	 the	 researcher	 coded	 the	 data	 according	 to	 themes	 that	
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seemed	to	be	reoccurring.	Based	on	the	nodes	that	have	been	formed	the	researcher	identified	patterns	and	arranged	key	themes.	In	the	analytical	work,	the	framework	of	Miles	and	Huberman	(1994)	has	been	applied,	and	their	codified	procedures	for	qualitative	analysis	were	followed	-	namely	the	process	of	reducing	data,	displaying	data	and	drawing	and	verifying	conclusions.		
	
5. The	role	of	political	capabilities	in	strategy	formation	In	 this	 section	we	will	 explore	how	MNE	 subsidiaries	design	 their	 lobbying	 capabilities	 in	 the	post-socialist	context.	Previous	research	has	found	that	the	tension	between	the	MNE’s	internal	(home	country	context)	and	external	(host	country	context)	legitimacy	requirements	is	likely	to	create	 difficulties	 for	 subsidiaries	 (Kostova	 and	 Zaheer,	 1999).	 Indeed,	while	 the	 parent	MNE	might	 require	mostly	 transparent,	 formalised	 and	 arm’s	 length	 public	 affairs	 practices,	 in	 the	host	country	environment	access	 to	policy-making	 is	provided	 through	 informal,	 top-level	and	often	non-transparent	lobbying	practices.	Furthermore,	as	these	difficulties	do	not	affect	purely	domestic	firms	-	as	they	are	not	experiencing	the	conflicting	pressures	of	institutional	duality	–	subsidiaries	 may	 become	 disadvantaged	 in	 the	 host	 country’s	 institutional	 context	 (Kosova,	1999).			Hence	 the	 first	 question	 that	 we	 will	 investigate	 is:	 How	 political	 capabilities	 emerge	 and	underpin	political	strategies	within	the	constraints	of	institutional	duality?	Findings	of	this	study	show	that	in	Hungary,	most	–	although	not	all	-	investigated	subsidiaries	had	 a	 public	 affairs	 (PA)	 or	 government	 relations	 team	 or	 a	 person	 assigned	 to	 deal	 with	government	 relations.	 These	 units	 are	 equipped	 with	 human	 resources	 and	 mostly,	 but	 not	always,	 a	 separate	 budget.	 Subsidiaries	 may	 also	 extend	 their	 lobbying	 capabilities	 by	contracting	public	 affairs	 agencies	 as	 an	 additional	 resource	 for	 the	 in-house	unit	 and	may	be	politically	active	through	associations	and	chambers	of	commerce.	Firms’	public	affairs	function	is	 defined	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 an	 organizational	 unit	 “responsible	 for	 maintaining	 external	legitimacy	 by	 managing	 the	 interface	 between	 an	 organization	 and	 its	 socio-political	environment	 (Meznar	 and	 Nigh	 1995:	 975).	 Studies	 show	 that	 “public	 affairs	 as	 a	 distinctive	function	is	more	likely	to	be	found	in	larger	national,	international	and	global”	companies	(Moss,	McGrath	et	al.	2012:	48),	however	 the	size,	structure	and	scope	of	 their	activities	may	be	very	diverse	 in	 different	 countries	 (Moss,	 McGrath	 et	 al.	 2012),	 nevertheless	 corporate	 lobbying	
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constitutes	a	part	of	the	public	affairs	function	(Harris,	Moss	et	al.	1998).	Although	in	a	minority	of	all	the	investigated	cases,	but	interviews	showed	that	at	some	subsidiaries	the	CEO	manages	political	strategies	alone,	without	being	supported	by	a	public	affairs	team	or	a	director.	Besides	the	public	affairs	department/director	however	subsidiaries	rely	on	several	other	 internal	and	external	resources	in	their	political	strategies.		Below	 table	 1	 indicates	what	 type	 of	 resources	multinational	 firms	 use	 in	 their	 local	 political	activities	in	Hungary.		
Origin	of	resources	 Internal	resources	 External	resources	Subsidiary	 • PA	 department	 or	person		
• CEO	of	subsidiary		
• Interpersonal	 network	 to	political	 decision-makers	and	 other	 corporate	leaders		Host	country	 	 • Membership	 in	 sectoral	association	
• Membership	 in	 chambers	of	commerce	
• Professional,	 local	 public	affairs	agencies	
• ‘Intermediaries’	 to	 get	access	 to	 prime	 minister-level	decision-making	Parent	 company	(MNE)	 • CEO	 of	 European	headquarter	 or	 mother	company		
• Parent	 company’s	standards	 and	procedures	 (through	compliance)	
• Pool	 of	 resources	 of	mother’s	 public	 affairs	department	
Interpersonal	networks	to	the	political	 decision-makers	 of	the	parent’s	home	country		
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As	the	table	illustrates	in	this	study	I	have	identified	resources	according	to	their	origin	as	well	as	whether	they	are	internal	or	external	in	nature.	I	define	internal	resources	as	those	that	are	available	 within	 the	 organisational	 structure	 of	 the	 firm,	 whereas	 external	 resources	 refer	 to	those	 that	 the	 firm	 acquires	 from	 its	 environment	 (both	 in	 the	 host	 and	 the	 home	 country).	Subsidiary-level	 resources	 refer	 to	 those	 that	are	available	within	 the	 subsidiary	 (internal),	 or	which	 belong	 to	 the	 subsidiary,	 but	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 external	 environment	 (external)	 like	interpersonal	 networks	 of	 the	 subsidiary’s	 staff	 in	 the	 host	 environment.	 I	 identified	 host	country	resources,	as	those,	which	are	available	and	drawn	from	the	host	environment,	however	which	 remain	external	 to	 the	 subsidiary	due	 to	 the	nature	of	 the	 contractual	 relationship,	 like	memberships	 in	external	bodies	and	public	affairs	 services	bought	 from	external	agencies	and	intermediaries.	Resources	at	the	level	of	parent	company	refer	to	those	political	resources	that	are	available	within	the	parent	company’s	organisational	structure	-	like	its	public	affairs	know-how	or	standards	and	procedures	–	or	which	are	available	externally	in	the	parent’s	company’s	country	of	origin,	like	the	networks	of	the	parent’s	staff	to	the	mother	country’s	political	leaders.		Interviews	suggest	that	in	Hungary	interpersonal	relationships	and	network-based	resources	are	crucial	 for	 lobbying	 strategies.	 Hence	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	MNE	 subsidiaries’	 PA	 directors	often	work	 closely	 together	with	 the	CEO	of	 the	 subsidiary	 in	 political	 activities.	 Furthermore	respondents	argued	that	the	CEO	of	the	European	headquarter	in	the	case	of	US	firms,	or	the	CEO	of	the	mother	company	at	European	firms	is	also	likely	to	be	involved	in	the	political	activities	of	subsidiaries	if	the	political	context	requires	it.	Unlike	in	the	home	country	context,	here	the	CEO	holds	 a	much	more	 important	 role	 in	 lobbying	 and	 hence	 is	 often	 involved	 in	 direct	 political	negotiations	with	 policy-makers.	 The	 importance	 of	 top-level	 networks	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	more	length	elsewhere	(Sallai	2013),	nevertheless	it	is	important	to	highlight	the	involvement	of	CEOs	here	as	well,	as	in	the	Hungarian	context	the	CEO	represents	an	internal	‘resource’	that	is	integrated	into	the	local	lobbying	strategy.		Findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 lobbying	 strategy	 that	 MNE	 subsidiaries	 develop	 in	 Hungary	 is	 a	mixture	of	 ingredients	 from	resources,	available	within	 the	MNE,	 the	subsidiary	as	well	as	 the	local	emerging	capitalist	environment.	The	following	chart	(chart	1)	shows	how	these	resources	are	 turned	 into	 political	 capabilities	 and	 how	 institutional	 duality	 contributes	 to	 capability	development	and	strategy	design:	
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	Chart	1:	The	contribution	of	institutional	duality	to	host	country	strategy	development	As	the	figure	shows	internal	and	external	resources	are	drawn	from	the	subsidiary,	 the	parent	company	as	well	as	the	local	institutional	environment.	These	resources	are	then	turned	by	the	subsidiary	into	two	types	of	political	capabilities.	Network-based	lobbying	capabilities	are	those	that	 are	 developed	 due	 to	 the	 institutional	 pressures	 of	 the	 host	 country’s	 institutional	environment,	 whereas	 arm’s	 length	 political	 capabilities	 are	 designed	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	internal	institutional	pressures	of	the	parent	company.		Now	that	we	have	explored	how	political	 capabilities	emerge	and	underpin	political	 strategies	we	 will	 investigate	 the	 second	 research	 questions:	 How	 subsidiaries	 organise	 and	 manage	corporate	political	activities	(CPA)	within	the	pressure	of	institutional	duality?	Applying	the	capabilities	framework	of	Oliver	and	Holzinger	(2008)	and	Boddewyn	and	Brewers’	view	that	the	forms	and	intensities	of	international	business	(IB)	political	behaviour	are	affected	by	 the	 firm's	 strategic	 choices	 of	 resources	 (Boddewyn	&	Brewer	 1994;	 Boddewyn	&	Brewer	2012),	I	argue	that	it	is	not	enough	for	political	resources	to	be	available	in	the	local	context,	the	
External	resources	 Internal	resources	
Arm’s	length	and	professional	lobbying	capabilities	Network-based	lobbying	capabilities		
Home	country	resources	Host	country	resources	 Subsidiary	resources	
Institutional	pressure	from	host	country	 Institutional	pressure	from	MNE	
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managerial	 choice	 of	 subsidiaries’	 top-level	 decision-makers	 has	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 how	 these	resources	 become	 integrated	 into	 political	 strategies.	 However	 as	 the	 chart	 shows,	 the	 use	 of	these	resources	is	impacted	by	the	forces	of	institutional	duality.		Findings	of	this	study	suggest	that	subsidiaries	use	both	external	and	internal	resources	in	their	localised	 strategy	 by	 turning	 them	 into	 different	 network-based	 and	 arm’s	 length	 political	capabilities.	However	the	proportion	of	use	of	network-based	and	arm’s	length	capabilities	differ	according	 to	 sectors	and	companies.	The	differences	 in	how	much	managers	 rely	on	network-based	and/or	arm’s	 length	 capabilities	within	 the	 localised	 strategy	depend	on	how	managers	perceive	the	pressures	of	institutional	duality.		Since	 2010	 the	 Orban	 government	 has	 increased	 its	 influence	 and	 intervention	 in	 the	economy	 (Bozóki	2012)	and	 introduced	exceptionally	high	 special	 taxes	 in	key	 service-related	sectors,	such	as	banking,	retail,	telecoms	and	energy	(Euractiv	2012).	Findings	suggest	that	firms	in	 sectors,	 which	 are	 less	 affected	 by	 state	 intervention	 and	 dominance	 (for	 instance	manufacturing),	 rely	more	 on	 arm’s	 length	 capabilities	 in	 their	 political	 strategies	 than	 those	companies	which	are	highly	affected	by	government	intervention,	special	taxes	and	regulation	–	such	as	 retail,	 telecoms	or	banking.	 Firms	 in	 sectors	of	high	government	 intervention	 seem	 to	rely	 more	 on	 network-based	 capabilities	 and	 value	 arm’s	 length	 capabilities	 in	 their	 political	strategies	 less.	 In	 these	 sectors,	 firms	 feel	more	 exposed	 and	 argue	 that	 they	 need	 to	 engage	directly	 with	 the	 government	 through	 network-based	 strategies	 as	 arm’s	 length	 strategies	 -	through	 for	 instance	 associations	 and	 chambers	 -	 do	 not	 lead	 to	 sufficient	 political	 results.	 In	contrast,	 managers	 of	 firms	 in	 less	 state-dominated	 sectors	 seem	 more	 positive	 about	 the	government	 in	 general	 and	 prioritise	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 government	 through	 arm’s	 length	practices,	and	interest	groups.		These	 findings	 are	not	 surprising	 as	 -	 since	2010	 -	 the	 government	has	dismantled	 the	emerging	post-socialist	 corporatist	 structures	 and	 introduced	 centralised	 governance	with	 the	almost	complete	exclusion	of	social	partners	from	political	decision-making.	Organized	interests	today	face	a	completely	different	institutional	environment	compared	to	the	pre-2010	period.	In	this	new	context,	the	government	chooses	its	partners	selectively	by	ignoring	those	that	are	well-established	 but	 not	 ‘friendly’	 and	 privileging	 those	 that	 are	 politically	 controlled	 or	 ‘pro-government’.	Particularism	also	takes	form	in	the	government’s	efforts	in	ignoring	existing,	well-established	associations	and	supporting	the	creation	of	new	ones,	which	are	less	critical	towards	the	 governing	 elite.	 One-sidedness	 also	 presents	 itself	 in	 how	 the	 government	 selects	 its	negotiating	 partners.	 In	 2012,	 the	 government	 has	 introduced	 the	 system	 of	 ‘Strategic	
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Partnerships’	 with	 the	 aim	 to	 include	 the	 “civil	 sector	 in	 the	 preparation	 of	 legislation”	 (The	Hungarian	Government	2012).	The	newly	introduced	system	of	social	dialogue	is	a	good	example	of	 how	 universal	 interest	 representation	 rights	 have	 been	 exchanged	 to	 particularistic,	relationship-based	 ones.	 Under	 the	 new	 framework,	 interest	 groups	 are	 supposed	 to	 directly	negotiate	 with	 the	 ministries	 in	 legislative	 procedures.	 Consultations	 however,	 are	 based	 on	invitation	 only.	 Hence	 only	 those	 organizations	 can	 get	 involved,	 which	 are	 invited	 by	 the	relevant	ministries.	Consequently,	all	non-invited	organizations	are	excluded	from	consultations.	In	practice,	a	centralised	and	clientele-based	consultation	structure	has	been	introduced,	which	formally	 satisfies	 the	 political	 rhetoric	 of	 providing	 social	 dialogue,	 but	 lacks	 real	 rights	 and	opportunities	 for	 stakeholders	 to	 engage	 in	 public	 decision-making	 through	 formal,	institutionalised	channels.		Similarly	 to	 the	 civil	 sector,	 after	 almost	 two	 years	 of	 complete	 lack	 of	 dialogue,	 in	 2012	 the	government	 also	 ‘opened’	politically	 towards	 the	business	 sector.	Yet,	 instead	of	 following	 the	paved	route	of	business	dialogue	through	associations	and	the	Interest	Representation	Council,	it	signed	 ‘Partnership	Agreements’	with	 individual	 firms.	By	July	2016	the	Ministry	of	National	Economy	has	signed	agreements	with	69	companies,	including	many	multinational	subsidiaries.	The	 agreements	 are	 based	 on	 individual	 criteria	 and	 informal	 deals,	 without	 any	 transparent	procedure	and	publicly	available	information.	The	agreements	are	negotiated	through	informal	personal	negotiations,	and	the	ministry	publishes	a	news	feed	about	the	deals,	containing	some	objectives	of	the	cooperation,	only	when	contracts	are	already	signed	(Sallai,	2014).		The	 chart	 below	 illustrates	 how	 the	 subsidiary	 manages	 political	 activities	 with	 its	nonmarket	 stakeholders	 in	 this	 centralised	 network-based	 capitalist	 environment.	 Although	there	 are	 some	 variations	 between	 companies,	 in	 general,	 public	 affairs	 departments	 at	subsidiaries	 reach	 out	 for	 political	 resources	 to	 their	 CEOs,	 sectoral	 associations/chambers	 of	commerce	 as	 well	 as	 their	 parent	 company.	 Yet,	 when	 lobbying,	 they	 channel	 information	 to	different	 levels	 of	 the	 public	 administration.	 First	 they	 target	 policy-making	 at	 administrator	level	in	the	central	government	or	alternatively	at	the	level	of	the	local	municipality.	On	this	level	they	 channel	 information	 through	 their	 membership	 in	 associations/chambers	 as	 well	 as	 in	highly	 regulated	 sectors,	 directly	 through	 the	 public	 affairs	 team.	 Second	 on	 the	 senior	ministerial	level	they	engage	via	the	same	routes	as	before,	however	at	this	level,	the	CEO	may	get	involved	as	well.		The	communications	director	at	subsidiary	7	underlined	the	importance	of	the	CEO	the	following	way:		
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“I	manage	the	state-secretary	level,	but	for	the	ministerial	level	you	need	the	CEO	or	a	first	level	
leader.”	(communications	director	at	subsidiary	7)	Third,	subsidiaries	–	especially	in	sectors	that	are	pressured	with	high	government	intervention	–	 also	 engage	 with	 policy-making	 via	 getting	 in	 touch	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 (through	intermediaries)	with	 the	 prime	minister.	 	 At	 this	 level	 however	 the	 CEO	 is	 the	 key	 person	 in	lobbying	and	the	public	affairs	department/director	only	has	an	intermediary	role.			
Figure	1:	Lobbying	process	at	subsidiaries	Figure	1	illustrates	how	resources	and	influence	are	channelled	within	the	lobbying	process.	The	CEO	of	the	subsidiary	may	get	involved	at	lobbying	the	ministerial	as	well	as	the	prime	minister’s	level.	However,	when	engaging	at	the	prime	minister’s	level,	the	subsidiary’s	CEO	often	reaches	out	for	the	CEO	of	the	mother	company	(to	use	his/her	power	as	an	internal	resource)	and	at	the	same	 time	 supports	 the	 PA	 department	 with	 his/her	 own	 influence	 as	 well,	 in	 lower-level	engagement.	The	European	PA	department	of	the	parent	company	(or	European	headquarter	in	case	 of	 US	 multinationals),	 as	 well	 as	 the	 sectoral	 association	 and/or	 chamber	 of	 commerce	provide	resources	for	the	subsidiary’s	PA	department	to	channel	influence	on	all	three	levels	of	engagement.	 I	 used	 dotted	 lines	 between	 the	 subsidiary’s	 PA	 department	 and	 the	 prime	
In-house	public	affairs	unit/person	
Sectoral	association	or	chamber	of	commerce	
 
Policy-makers/administrators	on	local	or	ministerial	level	if	applicable	(in	cases	when	a	formal	dialogue	takes	place)	
CEO	of	subsidiary	
Ministerial-level	government	officials	European	public	affairs	department	of	the	mother	company	
Prime	minister’s	level	directly	or	indirectly	CEO	of	mother	company	
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minister’s	level	as	at	this	level	-	although	the	PA	department	usually	gets	some	role	in	organising	the	meetings	-	it	is	generally	not	involved	in	the	actual	lobbying	process.		It	might	be	surprising	that	subsidiaries	channel	their	political	messages	not	only	to	the	level	of	public	 administrators	 and	 the	ministerial	 level,	 but	 also	 occasionally	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	 Prime	Minister.	 Interviews	 suggest	 that	 some	 policy	 fields	 and	 sectoral	 decisions	 have	 become	 so	centralised	during	the	Orban	administration	that	the	Prime	Minister	himself	has	a	crucial	role	in	making	 decisions.	 Especially	 in	 sectors	 of	 strong	 state	 intervention,	 several	 companies	mentioned	that	 they	try	 to	get	direct	contacts	or	contacts	 through	 intermediaries	 to	 the	Prime	Minister	 to	 influence	 decisions	 that	 might	 affect	 their	 operations.	 Furthermore,	 due	 to	 the	centralised	 and	 almost	 authoritarian	 characteristics	 of	 Hungarian	 post-socialist	 capitalism,	subsidiaries	 feel	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 extend	 their	 networking	 capabilities	with	 the	 interpersonal	relationships	of	the	parent	company.	As	the	CEO	of	subsidiary1	explained:	
“Since	this	regime	has	come	to	power,	they	[government	officials]	have	come	to	us	and	said	
you	 are	 a	 subsidiary,	 we	 want	 to	 talk	 to	 the	 boss.	 So	 this	 government	 has	 been	 very	
consistent...they	do	not	consider	us	[CEOs	of	subsidiaries]	the	decision-makers,	they	want	to	
go	straight	to	[the	name	of	the	parent	company	anonymised],	straight	to	the	top.	Before	this	
regime,	I	was	considered	the	decision-maker,	now	it	is	the	headquarters.“	As	 a	 consequence,	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 local	 institutional	 context,	multinational	 subsidiaries	 find	 different	 ways	 to	 adapt	 their	 lobbying	 strategies.	 Besides	employing	local	CEOs	or	a	local	Public	Affairs	director	-	in	case	the	CEO	is	an	expatriate	-	they	are	prepared	 to	 invest	 extensively	 into	 building	 and	 maintaining	 networks	 with	 local	 decision-makers	and	different	political	stakeholders.	The	following	quotation	by	the	CEO	of	Subsidiary9	shows	how	open	subsidiaries	are	to	the	requirements	of	the	local	context.		
“The	CEO	of	a	large	multinational	subsidiary	in	Hungary	is	an	important	person.	Maybe	
politically	it	is	necessary	to	bring	here	the	CEO	of	the	headquarters,	then	that’s	what	they	
will	do.	Multinationals	are	pragmatic.	They	will	bring	here	whoever	is	necessary,	the	
regional	or	even	the	world	leader,	if	it	is	worth	it.	In	my	case	as	well…If	I	can	arrange	
something,	then	I	do,	but	when	I	feel	that	somebody	needs	a	more	important	person,	then	I	
invite	the	regional	CEO	or,	if	they	[public	officials]	want	the	world	leader	of	the	company,	
then	we	bring	him	here.	Whatever	is	necessary...”1	As	 the	quote	 suggests,	multinationals	 adapt	 to	 the	host	 country	environment	by	accepting	 the	local	 rules	 of	 networking.	 They	 understand	 that	 networks	 provide	 access	 to	 decision-making,																																																									1	CEO,	Subsidiary9,	interviewed	by	author	in	Budapest,	24.01.2012	
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and	adapt	to	this	requirement	by	linking	top	managers	of	the	mother	company	or	the	subsidiary	with	the	relevant,	local	decision-makers.	Findings	discussed	so	far	provide	new	insights	into	how	subsidiaries	 develop	 their	 political	 capabilities	 and	manage	 their	 CPA	within	 the	 pressures	 of	institutional	duality.			As	 it	becomes	clear	 from	the	discussion,	Proposition	22	was	supported	by	 the	study’s	 findings.	MNE	subsidiaries	were	found	to	engage	in	network-based	political	strategies	in	order	to	adapt	to	the	 local	 institutional	 requirements.	 Subsidiaries	 develop	 network-based	 lobbying	 capabilities	with	 the	 integration	 of	 internal	 and	 external	 resources	 and	 rely	 on	 these	 capabilities	 in	 their	lobbying	strategies.	Although	all	companies	were	found	to	rely	on	network-based	capabilities	in	their	CPA	to	some	extent,	 firms	 in	sectors	of	stronger	state	 intervention	were	 found	to	engage	more	in	network-based	practices	as	they	are	more	exposed	to	government.	The	following	quote	from	 the	 CEO	 of	 subsidiary1	 explained	 the	 need	 of	 the	 network-based	 strategy	 the	 following	way:	
“There	are	only	a	very	few	real	decision-makers.	So	you	really	have	to	have	a	line	in	the	top.	
Empowerment	is	not	really	happening.	So	really,	truly	everything	goes	right	straight	to	the	
top.	There	are	two	or	three	people	that	influence	the	prime	minister,	but	even	they	do	not	
make	the	decisions	-	ultimately	the	Prime	Ministers	makes	the	decisions.”		The	quote	from	the	communications	director	at	subsidiary7	also	highlights	the	importance	of	network-based	capabilities:	
“There	is	a	regular,	very	high	level	relationship	between	us	and	the	government,	where	
behind	closed	doors	we	get	very	reassuring	signals”.	Besides	the	adaptation	to	network-based	lobbying,	in	the	empirical	part	of	this	study,	I	have	also	tested	 how	MNE	 subsidiaries	 transpose	 their	 parent’s	 political	 strategies	 in	 the	 host	 country	context.	 Proposition	 1	 explored	 whether	 MNE	 subsidiaries	 transpose	 their	 parent’s	 political	strategies	 in	 the	 host	 country	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 competitive	 advantage.	 The	 study	 investigated	whether	 subsidiaries	 take	 ‘ready-made’	 processes	 and	 know-how	 from	 the	 parent	 and	 adapt	these	to	the	local	environment	or	transpose	them	without	much	adaptation?	Proposition	1	was	not	supported	by	empirical	evidence.	Interviews	suggest	that	subsidiaries	rely	on	 the	resources	of	 the	parent	company	 in	 their	 lobbying	strategies,	however	only	as	much	as	they	 can	 be	 usefully	 integrated	 into	 their	 unique	 localised	 strategy.	 Subsidiaries	 were	 found	neither	 to	 rely	 on	 their	 parents	 in	 designing	 their	 local	 strategies,	 nor	 transposing	 parent	processes	or	strategies	directly	in	the	local	context.	Instead,	in	contrast	to	the	initial	expectations																																																									
2 Proposition 2: MNE subsidiaries engage in network-based political strategies in order to adapt to the local institutional 
requirements. 
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of	the	researcher,	they	were	found	to	design,	organise	and	manage	their	local	political	strategies	in	 accordance	with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 host	 country	 context,	while	 only	 using	 the	 parent	company’s	resources	as	a	pool	of	expertise	or	rather	like	a	support	hub	in	case	of	need.	Some	of	them	 were	 even	 found	 to	 rely	 on	 parent	 resources	 only	 for	 compliance	 and	 not	 on	 strategy	development.	Interviews	show	that	the	subsidiary	designs	a	local	lobbying	strategy,	integrating	network-based	and	arm’s	length	capabilities,	while	relying	on	some	of	the	parent’s	resources.	In	contrast	 to	 the	 initial	proposition	however	 the	parent’s	 lobbying	strategies	are	not	 transposed	directly.	The	following	quote	from	the	Director	of	communications	at	subsidiary	7	illustrates	this	claim:	
“We	can	use	the	frameworks	that	they	[parent	company]	provide,	so	for	instance	to	have	a	
corporate	 narrative,	 the	mother	 company	 provides	 the	 resources	 for	 stakeholder	 analysis	
and	 monitoring.	 They	 have	 a	 PA	 company	 and	 they	 also	 help	 us	 how	 to	 put	 together	 a	
communications	narrative,	we	 can	 rely	on	 their	 know-how	 in	 this.	They	 cannot	help	us	 in	
sorting	 out	 local	 conflicts	 as	 their	 cases	 are	 completely	 different.”(Interview	 with	
subsidiary7)	The	 chart	 below	 illustrates	 the	 conceptual	 framework	of	 how	parent	 strategies	 are	 integrated	into	the	subsidiary’s	localised	political	strategy:			
	This	process	was	found	at	most	subsidiaries.	Consequently,	the	evidence	of	this	study	suggests	that	 subsidiaries,	 which	 operate	 within	 the	 pressures	 of	 institutional	 duality	 organise	 and	manage	their	political	activities	by	integrating	resources	from	the	parent	company	as	well	as	the	host	country	in	a	unique	mix	of	localised	political	capabilities.	This	is	a	new	contribution	to	the	literature	as	earlier	quantitative	studies	could	not	identify	how	parent	strategies	are	transposed	
Political	resources	from	the	parent	company	/	and/or	compliance	with	ethical	and	procedural	rules	
Subsidiary	capabilities	by	integrating	parent	resources	with	local	resources	 Localised	political	strategy	
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within	the	institutional	duality	context	(Cuervo-Cazurra	2006;	Holburn	&	Zelner	2010;	Hillman	&	Wan	2005).		So	instead	of	implementing	or	transposing	parent	strategies	in	the	host	context,	they	develop	a	localised	 strategy	with	 the	 integration	 of	 resources	 from	 the	 parent	 company.	 The	 director	 of	government	relations	at	subsidiary	2	explained	this	process	the	following	way:	
“The	parent	company	does	not	necessary	know	what	the	local	environment	is	like	and	how	we	
can	operate	here.	They	serve	us	as	a	knowledge	centre,	when	I	need	information	I	go	the	
government	affairs	lady	in	[parent	company’s	location]	and	I	ask	about	vocational	training	in	
Europe.	So	they	provide	background	and	support	for	us,	they	are	not	at	all	actively	involved	in	
what	we	are	doing	here	on	the	political	level.”	Director	of	government	relations	at	Subsidiary	2	Surprisingly,	 subsidiaries	 were	 also	 found	 to	manage	 corporate	 political	 strategies	 in	 a	more	independent	and	less	integrated	way	than	earlier	literature	suggested.		In	earlier	studies	Hillman	and	Wan	 (2005)	 argued	 that	 subsidiary	 political	 strategies	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 parent	strategy	(2005:	328),	but	they	did	not	inform	us	about	the	process	of	this	influence.	This	study	addresses	 this	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 and	 extends	 Hillman	 and	Wan’s	 suggestion.	 Based	 on	 the	findings,	I	posit	that	although	subsidiaries	are	indeed	affected	by	parent	strategy,	this	impact	is	channelled	 through	 support,	 compliance	 and	 guidelines,	 rather	 than	 the	 direct	 ‘transfer	 of	political	skills	internally’	or	the	‘use	of	similar	strategies’	across	individual	subsidiaries	(Hillman	and	Wan,	20015:	328)	as	it	was	suggested	earlier.			The	following	quote	from	the	CEO	of	subsidiary	1	illustrate	well	how	independently	subsidiaries	form	their	political	strategies:	
“They	[parent	company]	 leave	the	strategy,	the	initiative	to	me.	To	figure	out	what	we	can	trade,	
how	to	manage	this	relationship.	If	you	need	the	CEO	[parent	company’s	CEO],	if	you	need	help	from	
above	 [from	 the	 parent	 company],	 call	 us	 [parent	 company]	 and	 we	 will	 come	 and	 help.	 If	 the	
meeting	needs	to	take	place	in	[location	of	parent	company	anonymised],	so	be	it,	but	the	CEO	[of	
the	 parent	 company]	 does	 not	 keep	 the	 Hungarian	 agenda	 on	 his	 screen.	 It	 is	 essentially	 my	
responsibility,	 up	 to	me	 to	make	 the	 initiative,	 I	 get	 very	 little	 substance	 in	 guidance	 in	 our	 PA	
strategy	from	[location	of	parent	company	anonymised],	you	need	to	meet	your	targets,	you	figure	
out	how	you	do	it.”	Findings	also	suggest	that	some	subsidiaries	do	not	rely	on	the	political	resources	of	their	parent	at	 all,	moreover	 some	 subsidiaries	manage	 their	 political	 strategies	 completely	 independently	from	the	parent	company.	In	these	cases	the	subsidiary	is	given	a	‘free	hand’	in	political	strategy	management	and	they	are	only	required	to	comply	with	the	parent	company’s	ethical	standards.	
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When	 asked	 about	 how	 the	 mother	 company	 affects	 their	 lobbying	 strategy,	 the	 director	 of	public	affairs	at	subsidiary	8	stated:	
“Not	 at	 all.	 If	 I	 have	 an	 idea	 about	 how	 I	 will	 approach	 a	 given	 topic,	 I	 go	 to	 my	 boss	
[subsidiary’s	CEO]	and	we	chose	the	most	suitable	[approach].”	(Director	of	public	affairs	at	
subsidiary	8)	Similarly,	 when	 asked	 whether	 they	 take	 any	 political	 strategies	 or	 processes	 from	 the	headquarters,	the	CEO	of	subsidiary	4	replied:	
“No,	I	am	given	a	free	hand,	the	only	think	is	that	I	have	to	inform	them	[parent	company]	
about	events.	“	(CEO	at	subsidiary	4)	
	Whereas	 the	Director	of	government	relations	at	 subsidiary	2	stated:	“we	basically	develop	our	
own	political	capabilities”.	The	quotations	above	suggest	that	subsidiaries	are	empowered	by	parent	companies	to	organise	and	manage	their	political	strategies	as	they	see	 fit,	and	rely	on	parent	resources	as	and	when	they	feel	necessary.		The	 only	 issue	 that	 seems	 to	 be	 common	 at	 all	 subsidiaries	 is	 their	 compliance	 of	 the	 parent	company’s	ethical	and	procedural	requirements.	However	how	compliance	is	managed	depends	largely	on	the	individual	decision	of	the	subsidiary’s	CEO	as	well.		As	 an	 example,	 when	 being	 asked	 about	 the	 mother	 company’s	 influence	 on	 their	 political	strategies	the	communications	director	at	subsidiary	7	explained:	
“We	have	very	strong	ethical	compliance	standards.	It	is	natural,	however	sometimes	it	is	
not	easy	to	adhere	to	them.“	Subsidiaries	 struggled	 to	 give	 examples	 of	 cases	 when	 the	 political	 strategy	 of	 the	 parent	company	 conflicted	with	 their	 own	 local	 level	 responses.	 The	majority	 of	 respondents	 argued	that	 it	 is	 a	major	 part	 of	 their	 job	 to	mediate	 between	 the	 local	 environment	 and	 the	 parent	company	and	therefore	although	institutional	duality	manifests	itself	on	a	daily	basis,	in	political	strategy	making	it	does	not	seem	to	cause	a	problem	or	a	constraint.	As	the	CEO	of	subsidiary	2	explained:	
“It	is	the	pivotal	role	of	the	management	team	to	be	the	mediator	between	these	two	worlds	
and	 if	 they	 [parent	 company’s	 management]	 do	 not	 trust	 me	 then	 we	 already	 have	 a	
challenge	and	a	problem.”	Similarly,	when	–	in	relation	to	compliance	–	the	CEO	of	subsidiary	4	was	asked	whether	he	has	to	write	a	memo	when	he	meets	a	minister,	he	answered:	“I	should,	but	I	normally	do	not.”		
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Based	 on	 the	 discussion	 so	 far	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 subsidiaries	 do	 not	 transpose	 their	 parent	strategies	 in	 the	 local	 context,	 but	 integrate	 resources	 from	 the	 parent	 company	 into	 the	lobbying	capabilities	that	they	develop	for	the	local	context.		Besides	the	adaptation	to	network-based	strategies	and	the	transfer	of	parent	strategies	in	 this	 study	 I	 have	 also	 explored	 Proposition	 3,	 trying	 to	 find	 evidence	 for	 ceremonial	adaptation	 suggested	 by	 earlier	 studies.	 I	 have	 tested	 whether	 MNE	 subsidiaries	 ‘pretend’	 to	follow	 the	 political	 strategies	 of	 the	 parent	 company,	 but	 in	 practice	 they	 engage	 in	 network-based	lobbying	(ceremonial	adaptation).		Proposition	 3	 was	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 findings.	 First	 of	 all,	 interviews	 suggested	 that	subsidiaries	 are	 transparent	 towards	 their	 local	 lobbying	 strategies	 vis	 a	 vis	 their	 parent	companies	as	they	are	given	rather	large	freedom	and	room	of	manoeuvre	in	how	they	organise	and	manage	 their	CPA.	 Secondly,	 they	often	 involve	 the	parent	 company’s	CEO	 in	 some	of	 the	local	 strategies,	 especially	 in	 cases	 when	 they	 rely	 more	 intensively	 on	 network-based	capabilities.	Thirdly	subsidiaries	openly	rely	on	and	integrate	the	parent’s	resources	in	designing	their	 network-based	 and	 arm’s	 length	 lobbying	 capabilities	 and	 hence	 are	 not	 motivated	 to	‘pretend’	 to	 follow	 parent	 strategies	 and	 in	 practice	 engage	 in	 network-based	 practices.	Compliance	with	parent	standards	and	procedures	was	highlighted	as	an	important	element	of	lobbying,	especially	in	relation	to	corruption	by	most	companies.	This	does	not	mean	that	there	may	 not	 be	 cases	 when	 subsidiaries	 engage	 in	 non-compliant	 or	 even	 corrupt	 practices	 and	would	 in	 that	 field	 consequently	 engage	 in	 ceremonial	 adaptations.	 However	 the	 scope	 of	investigation	in	this	study	was	limited	to	the	design	and	management	of	political	strategies	and	have	not	explored	the	issue	of	corruption,	therefore	this	questions	was	not	explored.				
6. Conclusion	Peng	 and	 Heath	 posited	 that	 the	 prevalence	 of	 network-based	 strategies	 is	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	institutional	 frameworks	 in	 transition	economies	 (1996).	Extending	 this	 claim,	 findings	of	 this	study	suggest	that	subsidiaries	not	only	engage	in	network-based	(Peng,	2003b,	Peng	and	Heath,	1996)	or	relational	strategies	(Luo	and	Zhao,	2013a),	but	reacting	to	the	pressure	of	institutional	duality,	actively	design	a	‘combined’	strategy	in	emerging	economies.		Evidence	 presented	 in	 this	 article	 illustrates	 that	 subsidiaries	 design	 their	 lobbying	portfolio	by	integrating	and	adapting	different	elements	of	the	home	and	host	country	resources	
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into	 arm’s	 length	 and	 network-based	 lobbying	 capabilities,	 a	 combination	 of	which	 they	 then	turn	into	a	unique	localised	lobbying	strategy.	I	argue	that	this	complex	localised	strategy	is	an	important	element	of	how	MNEs	gain	competitive	advantages	and	global	leadership	in	emerging	market	contexts.	By	identifying	a	theoretical	connection	not	previously	addressed	between	the	literatures	 on	 CPA,	 resource	 dependence	 and	 institutional	 duality,	 the	 study	 revealed	 how	political	capabilities	are	organized	within	the	institutional	duality	context.		This	 study	 addresses	 earlier	 calls	 for	 research	 to	 explore	 how	 context-specific	 resources	 are	developed	 by	 interaction	 of	 global	 and	 local	 processes	 (Meyer	 and	 Peng	 2005)	 and	 how	 the	interaction	between	 the	parent	 and	host-country	 forces	 exert	 influence	on	 subsidiary	political	activities	(Blumentritt	and	Nigh,	2002).	Findings	contribute	to	IB	literature’s	claim	that	foreign	subsidiaries	 develop	 their	 own	 advantages	 in	 host	 country	 contexts	 (Rugman	 et	 al.,	 2006).	However	the	evidence	presented	here	show	that	the	conformation	to	local	institutions	does	not	necessarily	mean	 giving	up	 the	 comparative	 institutional	 advantage	 as	 previous	 literature	has	claimed	(Ahmadjian,	2016,	Luo,	2002),	but	instead	could	contribute	to	gaining	local	advantages.		Furthermore,	 instead	 of	 constraining	 MNE	 subsidiaries’	 strategy	 choices	 as	 was	previously	suggested	by	studies	that	focus	on	legitimacy	(Kostova	and	Roth,	2002,	Kostova	and	Zaheer,	 1999),	 if	 viewed	 from	 an	 interdisciplinary	 angle,	 through	 the	 analytical	 framework	 of	resource	 dependence,	 institutional	 duality	 shapes	 subsidiaries’	 capabilities	 for	 strategy	development	and	enables	them	to	design	a	localised	strategy.	The	nature	of	the	case	study	limits	the	 generalisability	 of	 findings.	 Further	 research	 should	 explore	whether	 subsidiaries	 react	 to	institutional	 duality	 the	 same	 way	 in	 other	 post-socialist	 as	 well	 as	 emerging	 economies.	However	the	proposed	framework	can	offer	a	starting	point	for	empirical	studies	to	test	whether	subsidiaries	in	other	emerging	market	contexts	would	design	their	strategies	similarly.					 	
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